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Investigation of synesthesia phenomenology in adults is needed to constrain accounts
of developmental trajectories of this trait. We report an extended phenomenological
investigation of sequence-space synesthesia in a single case (AB). We used the Elicitation
Interview (EI) method to facilitate repeated exploration of AB’s synesthetic experience.
During an EI the subject’s attention is selectively guided by the interviewer in order
to reveal precise details about the experience. Detailed analysis of the resulting 9 h
of interview transcripts provided a comprehensive description of AB’s synesthetic
experience, including several novel observations. For example, we describe a specific
spatial reference frame (a “mental room”) in which AB’s concurrents occur, and which
overlays his perception of the real world (the “physical room”). AB is able to switch his
attention voluntarily between this mental room and the physical room. Exemplifying the EI
method, some of our observations were previously unknown even to AB. For example,
AB initially reported to experience concurrents following visual presentation, yet we
determined that in the majority of cases the concurrent followed an internal verbalization
of the inducer, indicating an auditory component to sequence-space synesthesia. This
finding is congruent with typical rehearsal of inducer sequences during development,
implicating cross-modal interactions between auditory and visual systems in the genesis
of this synesthetic form. To our knowledge, this paper describes the first application of
an EI to synesthesia, and the first systematic longitudinal investigation of the first-person
experience of synesthesia since the re-emergence of interest in this topic in the 1980’s.
These descriptions move beyond rudimentary graphical or spatial representations of the
synesthetic spatial form, thereby providing new targets for neurobehavioral analysis.
Keywords: sequence-space synesthesia, phenomenology, elicitation interview, conscious experience, case study
INTRODUCTION
In sequence-space synesthesia (SSS) (also known as spatial-form
synesthesia), ordinal sequences such as numbers, letters and cal-
endar months are experienced as occupying precise locations in
extended areas of space (Price, 2009; Ward, 2013). Despite affect-
ing up to 20% of the population (Sagiv et al., 2006; Mann et al.,
2009), our understanding of the visual phenomenology of this
experience is largely limited to schematic spatial representations
of concurrents spatial-forms (see for example Figure 1).
Some of the most complete introspective reports of SSS were
collected from 26 SS synesthetes, via a questionnaire with both
open-ended and “yes/no/maybe” questions (Seron et al., 1992).
This investigation of Seron et al. uncovered a number of features
afforded little attention in subsequent research. For example, one
subject indicated that certain sections of their number form had
a black background and white digits, whilst other sections had
a white background and black digits (see Figure 2). Nineteen
subjects reported that once “activated,” a concurrent could not
be moved (Seron et al., 1992, p. 174). Subjects also reported being
better able to “make use” of their representation where they had
a free “visual field,” e.g., when their eyes were closed, and that the
“vividness” of the number concurrent increases when the subjects
concentrate on it (Seron et al., 1992). One subject reported auto-
matically experiencing the concurrents immediately surrounding
the induced item, although these adjacent numbers were “a bit
less salient” (Seron et al., 1992, p. 180). Seron et al. re-ignited
interest in the exploration of SSS, but concluded that the “gen-
uineness of the number representations” remains the primary
open question (Seron et al., 1992, p. 185). Twenty years later, the
majority of published research on SSS continues to be concerned
with establishing the reliability and behavioral impact of SSS. For
example, SSS has been shown to reduce reaction times to items
presented in positions congruent to a concurrent spatial location
(e.g., Jarick et al., 2009a). However, there has been little regard for
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FIGURE 1 | AB’s number form as produced at the start of the
investigation (left) and 22 months later (right).
the phenomenal aspects which may shed light on other processes
known to be modulated by SSS, e.g., visuospatial working mem-
ory, visuospatial imagery, sequence representation and memory
for personal or historical dates (see Price and Mattingley, 2013
for a review).
The Elicitation Interview (EI, also known as the Explicitation
Interview) technique is derived from the phenomenological tra-
dition of Husserl and the study of phenomenological content of
conscious experience (Vermersch, 1994). The EI was formulated
specifically for the purposes of obtaining descriptions of pre-
reflective experience (that is, aspects of our experience which we
are not aware of, prior to active reflection upon them), whereas
a semi-structured interview is more generally applied to gather
information on the reflective experience of the subject. In per-
forming an EI, the trained interviewer guides the introspection of
the subject by directing their attention to precise aspects of their
phenomenological experience (Vermersch, 1994). This model of
pre-reflective access is based on the premise that guided intro-
spection facilitates the transformation of implicit to explicit.
Commentary has been provided elsewhere on whether EI itself
changes the experience, rather than enabling increased reporting
access to the experience (see Froese et al., 2011a). This debate is
primarily a philosophical issue of deep versus shallow concepts of
lived experience and is outside the scope of this paper.
EI has previously been applied to increase awareness of epilep-
tic prodrome features (Petitmengin et al., 2007), to understand
the adaptation strategies of elderly drivers (Cahour et al., 2010),
to provide introspective access to unconscious decision making
processes (Petitmengin et al., 2013), and to develop and iden-
tify distinct “attentional states” before the onset of a cognitive
task (Lutz et al., 2002) [see also Maurel (2009) for other appli-
cations and Froese et al. (2011a) for a review of recent research
using second-personmethods]. A full and detailedmethod for the
conduct of an EI has been presented elsewhere (e.g., Petitmengin,
FIGURE 2 | Number form for subject JB reported in Seron et al.
(1992). Note the features of defined background color, similar to the
context reported by our subject, and the high contrast between digit and
background color, which we propose to be a feature of the context,
enabling the concurrent to be readily visible. Reproduced with permission
from Seron et al. (1992), with permission from Elsevier Limited. License
Number: 3364950446639.
2006). Below we provide a brief overview of the assumptions and
priorities in EI data collection, to highlight the unique proper-
ties of this method and how it may be applied beneficially in the
investigation of synesthesia phenomenology.
During the EI, we aim for the subject to reach and main-
tain an “evocation state” through interviewer-led direction of
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attention. Evocation is a deep introspective state in which the
subject is in “direct contact” with their experience, and re-living
it as they speak. A positive evocation state is suggested by slow
and considered speech, avoidance of generalizations, a distant
or unfocused gaze and often the use of language in the present
tense (the subject may say, “I can see . . .” rather than “I remem-
ber seeing . . .”). There is some similarity between the induction
of the evocation state and that of a hypnotic state. The inter-
viewer may use “Ericksonian” language to refocus the subject
and gain access to pre-reflective experience, for example when
the participant responds, “I don’t know . . .,” the interviewer may
ask, “How do you know that you don’t know?” (Petitmengin,
2006). Although the original event may only have lasted a sec-
ond, through EI we are able to prolong and extend the experience
of that event during the evocation state, through subtle use of
language and cues. A potential risk in the collection of such
first-person data of this kind is the unintentional retrospective
transformation of events, as demonstrated by experimental false
memory induction (e.g., Loftus and Pickrell, 1995) and false
recollection (Greenberg, 2004). Petitmengin et al. (2013) have
recently demonstrated that the process of becoming aware of pre-
viously pre-reflective aspects of experience does not necessarily
lead to confabulation. The specific language used by partici-
pants in reporting false memories will, however, allow a skilled
interviewer to recognize infidelity in the report and exclude the
relevant section from analysis (Froese et al., 2011a). Other bias
effects are reduced in the normal practice of EI by monitoring
and maintaining the evocation state of the subject, to ensure they
are reliably verbalizing the experience and not their beliefs about
the experience. Active and open questioning, with rephrasing of
the subjects own statements, serves to draw attention to specific
aspects which may generally be overlooked in normal discourse.
Examples of good practice in bracketing to reduce bias effects and
maintaining evocation are provided in theMaterials andMethods
section.
We present here an extended phenomenological description
of SSS in a single case. We apply the EI technique, and demon-
strate that qualitative second-person techniques can be used
to gather first-person information about a perceptual experi-
ence of SSS, which may be used to guide future qualitative
and quantitative investigations. The assumptions of EI make it
particularly suited to dissecting processes such as SSS, which
appear to occur automatically or with little conscious effort, but
which also retain a cognitive “anchor” or event upon which to
ground the interview. Steady-state experiences such as synesthe-
sia may also engender high fidelity reports, as the event can be
reported immediately as it unfolds, rather than retrospectively.
The results of the EI were analyzed following Petitmengin (2006),
involving successive iterations of aggregation and abstraction of
themes, schemas or structures of the experience. This process
is similar to the more widely practiced Grounded Theory anal-
ysis of qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The themes
uncovered via this method have been collated and organized
into a detailed and expandable html mind map, which we
have made available to readers via the Supplementary Materials.
This paper, supported by the Supplementary Materials, presents
converging evidence on the reproducibility of the Seron et al.
phenomenological investigations. Importantly, we extend the
level of phenomenological detail acquired and describe novel
aspects of the SSS experience. We demonstrate that a more
complete understanding of SSS phenomenology may shed light
on features of the experience such as the spatial reference
frame in which the concurrents exist, along with issues relat-
ing to the apparent automaticity of concurrents and vividness
of spatial-forms, which in turn may speak to the recent re-
framing of SSS as relating to enhanced visual imagery (Price and
Mattingley, 2013). We also demonstrate that greater detail in our
understanding of the phenomenological experience of SSS can
reveal subtle idiosyncratic aspects of the SSS experience, which
may contribute to our understanding of the development of
this trait.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The subject (AB) is a 30 year old, right handedmale with nomed-
ical history of psychological or neurological trauma. AB reported
to have experienced SSS for numbers, days of the week and
months, for as long as he could remember. Prior to interview,
no facet of AB’s SSS was identified as particularly remarkable or
out of the ordinary. To test the consistency of his spatial-forms,
AB was asked to reproduce his number forms at the start of
data collection and again 22 months post interview. These two
schematics are sufficiently similar to confirm the genuineness of
AB’s synesthesia (see Figure 1).
CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted by a trained and experienced EI
practitioner. Nine hours of interview were conducted over nine
non-consecutive sessions spanning 2 months. The interviews
were conducted in a private room and recorded following the
informed consent of the subject. The interviews were exploratory
and involved a fluid examination of topics of interest as they arose.
Inducers were presented audibly, for example the interviewer
would ask “If I say, five . . . What do you see?” (20100215_79-
81)1. A visually presented inducer was used on three occasions
(20100408_3, 20100408_65, 20100415_19), with the inducer
drawn on a page of the interviewer’s notebook. The nature and
purpose of the EI method was defined for the participant at the
beginning of the first interview session. The interviewer high-
lighted the requirement for the subject to describe the experience
in detail, and reminded the participant of the interviewer’s role
in guiding and maintaining the focus of attention, suggesting
that these particular skills may develop as the series of inter-
views progress (20100215_2). EI is more commonly applied in
the exploration of past events, either naturally occurring or
triggered for the purposes of the interview. In the present investi-
gation, experiences were triggered by the interviewer, during the
interview itself, and then immediately described and re-evoked.
This deviation from the standard EI practice enabled the free
1Throughout the Materials and Methods and Results sections, we have made
use of direct quotations from interview transcripts, in order to convey the
essence of the interview conduct and mode of questioning. Quotations are
referenced with the interview date in the format YYYYMMDD and the
paragraph number in the transcript.
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exploration of the SSS experience, rather than limiting the inter-
view content to a single event. Each interview session began by
revisiting the features of interest in the previous interview, or
addressing any topics which had been raised informally between
interviews.
Maintaining the subject’s focus
The interviewer used active questioning and reformulation of
the subject’s own words in order to maintain attention on a
single instant or aspect of the experience, as exemplified in the
questioning style demonstrated below.
AB: Ahm . . . I’m looking at it . . . at the moment I’m project-
ing it onto the screen in front of me and just . . . It’s all on that
screen. INTERVIEWER: So if you look at that screen . . . (20100215_
45-46).
Here the subject refers to concepts of “projecting” and “screen,”
both of which have not been explored at this stage. In order to
gain a description of what the subject means by the use of these
words, the interviewer simply asks AB to look at the screen and
describe what he sees.
AB: So, so you can sort of see a floor underneath the five, and
then there’s kind of a wall . . . ahm (20100222_20, 20100222_22).
INTERVIEWER: And if you focus on the wall and the floor,
and try to keep your focus there, how does the periphery look?
(20100222_32).
Here the interviewer uses the terms “wall” and “floor” as the sub-
ject did. This reuse of the subjects own words serves to maintain
and focus his attention on these specific features.
Bracketing for bias reduction
“Bracketing” interpretations of events is conducted during the
interview and during analysis, to minimize the interpretive bias.
Data were removed from analysis if the interviewer’s questioning
was deemed to be leading. Examples of bracketed or excluded data
are given below for clarity (emphasis added).
1. INTERVIEWER: Can you say something of where this is being
presented to you? AB: Yeah, I think I’m projecting a mental
image in front of me. INTERVIEWER: Okay, well maybe we’ll
come back to that later (20100215_16-23).
2. INTERVIEWER: But interestingly enough, the number line,
when I asked you to have one behind you, latched onto the floor
(20100329_206).
In (1) the interviewer identified a “belief” or theory that the sub-
ject held about his experience. The subject says, “I think I’m . . .,”
demonstrating that he is trying to infer or interpret what he is
doing, rather than simply describing the experience. He interprets
this action as “projecting.” “Projecting” is a term often used in
the context of synesthesia to refer to the relative location of con-
currents, in external or peripersonal space, and as such may be
used by the participant as an analogy or “short-cut” to describe
a projector-like experience. The interviewer chose to immediately
divert from this description and return to the topic at a later time2
. In (2) the interviewer allowed their own beliefs about the experi-
ence to enter the discourse. The term “latching” is not used by the
subject himself at any point in the interview. The line of ques-
tioning suggests that the interviewer formed a belief regarding
attachment between the concurrent and another object in ear-
lier interview sessions, however, this is the only time in which the
belief is imposed upon the subject. This section of interview and
all related discourse were removed from analysis.
ANALYSIS
Interview data were transcribed and then processed through
successive rounds of coding, aggregation and abstraction, as illus-
trated in Figure 3. Data analysis was conducted blind (that is, not
by the interviewer), by a researcher trained in the EI method with
no prior theoretical knowledge of SSS, as suggested in Froese et al.
(2011b). Blind analysis enabled the independent observation of
any interviewer bias and ensured that the themes devised were
are only those which are present in the data.
Interview audio files were transcribed verbatim by contracted
professionals, including stammers and interjections. Transcribers
noted changes in pace, intonation or volume of speech, where
specific emphasis is placed on words, and significant or lengthy
pauses, to assist in the monitoring of evocation state. Transcribers
were blind to the nature and purpose of the interviews. Fidelity
of transcription was checked against a random sample of audio
files. Transcribed data were assessed for validity according to the
principles of EI, by confirming that the report related to the
experience as it happened and did not contain comments or
thoughts about the experience on the part of the participant or
interviewer. Reports were also examined for consistency over the
interview sessions. Any reports found to be incompatible with
the EI requirements or inconsistent across sessions were excluded
from analysis.
The complete set of interview transcripts were read through
by the analyst, to identify initial themes or topics. Themes were
then summarized into short statements and a code devised to
represent the theme. The code was subsequently attached to rele-
vant sections of the transcript using QSR NVivo 9 software (QSR
International, 2010). Once all data relevant to a particular theme
had been coded, the theme summary was revised and new sub-
theme codes were devised. A second round of coding was then
conducted using sub-themes.
The coded transcript was exported with paragraph refer-
ences into Freemind mind mapping software (FreeMind Project,
2010), clustered by themes and sub-themes. Individual excerpts
were systematically arranged into appropriate headings (with
further subheadings generated where necessary) to ensure all
references to a topic were collated. The tree-like representation
of the mind-mapping software enabled a systematic analysis of
the temporal development of events through vertical arrange-
ment of branches (diachronic structure), and aggregation of
simultaneously occurring aspects of the experience (synchronic
2Note that term “projecting” was also bracketed in the earlier example (1.
Maintaining the subject’s focus) as the interviewer pursued a line of ques-
tioning relating to the known object of the “screen.”
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic of data collection and analysis process.
structures) under a single heading. Ordered clusters were sum-
marized into short sections of prose describing the content and
context of the cluster. Abstractions were made for every level
of the map from the lowest to the highest level of the theme
(for example, the description of the concurrent contexts includes
4 levels of abstraction, over 77 separate sub-headings—see
Supplementary Material).
RESULTS
The EI sessions provide comprehensive descriptions of the first-
person experience of SSS for subject AB, including aspects of
which AB was previously unaware. Analysis of EI data identi-
fied several themes of potential importance to SSS research. Full
detail of each of these themes are provided in an html expandable
mindmap via the SupplementaryMaterial, with the bottom-most
level of each branch containing all transcript references which
were collated in the generation of the theme. The themes and
descriptions are not exhaustive of the SSS phenomenology for
this participant, rather they reflect the developing discourse of the
interview sessions.
DISCOURSE CONTENT
Table 1 outlines the coverage of individual codes in the tran-
scripts. Themajority of the discussion was related to AB’s number
form (55.8% of all discourse) as opposed to his calendar or alpha-
bet forms (15.5% and 10.3%, respectively). Some of the most
informative phenomena were only covered briefly during inter-
view (for example only 1.4% of the transcripts are related to
interference from the physical room, see section Mental room),
however, when these brief statements are collated and examined
in terms of their interactions in the data as a whole, we find them
to be relevant to much of the synesthetic experience.
BASIC FORM DESCRIPTIONS
The forms examined include a spatial number form, mathemat-
ical concepts such as pi, an alphabet form, a form for age, a cal-
endar form for years, a form for the months of year and multiple
forms for time. These data provide a comprehensive description
of the visual synesthetic experience and on the whole are con-
sistent with descriptions obtained by less rigorous methods. This
continuity demonstrates that in terms of basic phenomenology,
our participant’s experience may be considered “normal” for SSS.
Brief descriptions of the spatial forms are provided below, with
further detail available in the Supplementary Materials.
Number form and mathematical concepts
Number concurrents generally appear as black Arabic symbols in
an Arial-like type face. Certain numbers (notably five and fifty six)
are described as having “metallic” (20100222_247) or “velvety”
textures (20100222_321) or surface patterns such as “cross hatch-
ing” (20100408_67) or pockmarks, “as if the ink has come away
in lots of places” (20100320a_246). The texture or patterning may
move around and change although the number itself remains
static.
Both fractions and decimals are viewed in the correct posi-
tion relative to their surrounding numbers. Different notations
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Table 1 | Coding summary report.
Theme Coverage (%) No. occurrences
Forms 101.2 49
Number 55.8 32
Alphabet 10.3 6
Age 6.1 1
Calendars 15.5 6
Physical-mental room 0.02 33
Interference from physical room 1.4 29
Contexts 27.38 361
White Page 0.08 99
Corridor 0.08 122
Free Space 0.03 17
Line 0.14 156
Cave 0.02 17
Felt presence 0.02 28
Context transitions 0.02 32
Inducer-concurrent relationships 11.3 56
Multiple representations 7.7 50
Perspective 5.1 69
Stability 6.1 60
Attention 3.2 31
Knowledge 1.5 22
Voluntarily controllable acts 6.4 56
Major themes are given in bold font, with sub-themes in italics. Coverage rep-
resents the percentage of all interview data which were coded to a particular
theme or sub-theme. A reference may be coded to two or more items when
a particular section of discourse is relevant to a number of different themes,
thus the total coded coverage does not sum to 100%. Number of occurrences
gives the number of separate references to a theme or sub-theme within the
interview data, with each instance being variable in length from a single line to
an extended discussion. As the interviews were exploratory, the coverage does
not necessarily reflect the content of general SSS experience, rather it relates
to the content of the interview.
of fractions can be generated intentionally (e.g., 1.5 may be repre-
sented as 3/2 or 6/4)and appear as though superimposed on top
of each other. Large numbers (in the thousands) appear with the
comma separator.
When discussing mathematical concepts, multiple defining
equations and graphs are involuntarily experienced following a
related inducer. For example, when discussing Planck’s constant
the subject reports, “I got e equals H bar times F . . .. And just
underneath I’ve got H bar times a Greek nu as well [. . .] I’ve
got H bar equals H over 2 pi.” (20100320a_219-224). These con-
currents include visual experiences of letters and numbers to
multiple decimal places, and associated graph forms. For exam-
ple, INTERVIEWER: “What about e? AB: So I’ve got a flash of the
exponential curve and then I saw the letter e, it took a while for
the equal sign and numbers to appear but then they are there.”
(20100320a_71-72). “INTERVIEWER: If you go back to e, do you
see the two graphs that you mentioned? AB: Yeah, kind of one
over here and one over there.” (20100320a_137-138).
Numbers such as pi are experienced in their correct position
in relation to the integer on the number line. A black area or
“black hole” (20100229_200) is experienced for numbers with
infinite decimal places, with the decimal numbers trailing toward
the black hole, “sucking up all those infinite digits . . . just sort
of get them out of the way” (20100229_200). The black hole is
flat and AB can change his perspective to view it from behind
(20100229_122).
Alphabet form
AB’s synesthetic form for the alphabet appears as capital let-
ters (20100329_215), in an Arial-like type face (20100329_337-
339) with a “ghost-like” translucency (20100408_313) and a
reproducible spatial relationship between alphabet items. Specific
patterns or textures are generally not reported with the let-
ter form, however, following inspection of the letter B it is
described as though “it’s made of ribbons attached to each other”
(20100408_329).
Ages
AB experiences concurrents similar to his number form when
exploring concepts of age. AB reports, however, that the experi-
ences of age and number concurrents are differentiated because
numbers (such as 28) are more often used in the context of age
rather than mathematics (20100320b_90).
The concurrents elicited by inducer concepts of prena-
tal ages (conception to birth) are accompanied by static
visual scenes of embryonic development to a hospital scene
with a woman in labor representing birth (20100320b_
103-138). The description of the scene for birth (age zero) con-
tains doctors and nurses in a hospital room, medical implements
on a tray, storage drawers and a work surface, a woman lying
on a bed, a window which looks onto the hospital corridor and
electrical equipment over the bed (20100320b_153). AB reports
that he can hear the sound of a baby crying from somewhere
outside the scene but no other sounds from the hospital room
itself (20100320b_139-149).When AB is asked if there is anything
“before” that scene (equivalent to negative numbers) he reports a
“vague sense of something in the womb” (20100320b_110) but
with an unknown or indistinct location. When the interviewer
induces “6 months pregnancy” AB is able to identify the loca-
tion of this age and reports “a sort of fairly black womb with
a sort of like fetus in it” (20100320b_112). AB also describes
other scenes in separate spatial locations, including conception
“at the very top” as a “magnified picture of an egg with loads
of sperm” (20100320b_127), then a fertilized egg and a “clump
of cells” (20100320b_114) followed by further cell divisions in
the embryonic development. Zero and one years of age are sep-
arated in space to accommodate “all those first months in the first
year of life” (20100320b_182). When directed to the zero time
point, AB reports images of a new-born baby “wrapped up in
white blankets”, and at 6 months old AB reports hearing a baby
cry (20100320b_192).
The interviewer proposes that the first year might contain
images of a baby “crawling around on the floor, or some-
thing like that” (20100320b_195). At this stage AB remarks
that he is beginning to experience “a few more general images”
(20100320b_196), including the memory of an occasion where
he saw a friends child at one year old. AB spontaneously offers
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that these images are quite distinct from those described in rela-
tion to prenatal age, as he is positioned within the scene and
it is surrounding him (20100320b_196), where as in the pic-
torial representations of age AB was not himself a feature of
the scene.
Calendars
AB reports a spatial form for calendar aspects such as years,
months and time. His year form is similar to his number form,
but there is no comma separator. The inducer “one thousand,
nine hundred and ninety five” leads to the experience of a num-
ber concurrent, whereas the inducer “nineteen ninety five” leads
to a year concurrent (20100320a_237). AB is able to describe and
draw his spatial form for the more abstract year inducer of 4000
BC, with an inflection point between BC and AD.
AB’s spatial form for months includes the experience of digits
and a line arranged circularly, with August at the top and subse-
quent months arranged clockwise, with February at the bottom.
Within the months themselves each 10 day segment follows a spe-
cific direction on the line such that AB can identify a date not
only by the position of that month in relation to the others but
also by the direction of the numbers on the line surrounding
the date.
AB reports a clock concurrent induced by the time of day. His
synesthetic clock takes multiple forms: (1) an analog clock face
with hour and minute hands, minute markers and larger hour
markers; (2) an orange digital clock with a flashing semicolon for
seconds; (3) a separate digital clock with a different type-face. In
directing his attention to aspects of the analog clock, AB is able to
induce the experience of digits on the clock face where there were
none before. AB reports the apparent motion of a second hand as
it flashes “in and out of existence” (20100320b_16-18) each time
his attention returns to it.
THEMES WITHIN THE SSS EXPERIENCE
The themes identified in the EI go beyond basic form descriptions
of as they address precise aspects of the experience and how it
unfolds. Six main themes were identified from the interviews, as
illustrated in Figure 4.
Mental room
AB describes his synesthetic percepts as existing in a “mental
room” (20100320a_108) as opposed to the physical room, which
refers to the room in which the interview was conducted and
which supports the normal (non-synesthetic) visual experiences
(20100408_193). The percepts in the mental room are “superim-
posed” on the physical room (20100408_137); they have the same
physical location as items in the mental room, but the mental and
physical exist as if in two “different dimensions” (20100408_163,
20100408_165, 20100408_189).
I’m sort of seeing the [physical] room behind [the concurrent]. But
then I sort of feel the [concurrent] letters are in a different kind of
space as well (20100329_235).
It’s almost like you have this whole room and then there’s like a
copy of this whole room (20100408_191). And then the pen stays in
this [physical] room. But all the [synesthetic] numbers and things are
in the copy of this room [the mental room] (20100408_193).
AB reports that he can switch his attention between the phys-
ical and mental rooms by forced effort (20100320a_108) or
defocusing his eyes and “looking into space” (20100408_33).
AB retains an awareness of the physical room whilst look-
ing at the synesthetic percepts (20100320a_112) although
the physical room appears “out of focus” (20100320a_114),
similar to a normal experience of an item in peripheral
vision (20100320a_114).
Erm, well I can just alternate my attention between the physical room
and the mental room I’ve got (20100320a_108).
I guess all of the physical room is like erm, like what’s in my
periphery normally. So the focus of my eyes is somewhere about here,
because there’s nothing in the physical room here. The whole physical
room is out of focus (20100320a_114).
INTERVIEWER: So if you focus your attention on the [men-
tal room] . . . your visual awareness of the [physical] room fades
out . . .? AB: Yeah. It never leaves me completely, the physical room
(20100320a_111-112).
Concurrents tend to be located in areas of space where there is lit-
tle interference from physical objects, such as the top of an empty
table (20100329_89) or in an area of clear space (20100329_107,
20100415_238).
If my eyes are kind of focused on some point in space in which there
is no physical object, then it’s easier [for the concurrent to appear]
(20100408_31).
If there’s an object in this [physical] room, in the same place as
one of the numbers are in the other [mental] room, then I see the
object rather than the number (20100408 195).
The floor in this [physical] room is obscuring the floor in that
space [the mental room]. I can’t really see down (20100415_278).
The interference of visual percepts in the physical room upon
synesthetic percepts in the mental is also reported in the visual
presentation of an inducer, where AB reports having to look away
from the “distracting piece of paper” (20100408_13) in order to
experience the synesthetic form.
INTERVIEWER: What do you see? [Shows AB a letter H drawn
on a notepad] AB: I see the letter H on the page. INTERVIEWER:
So what do you need to do in order to see the alphabet line? AB:
Erm, have to look away from the image. I can see them here (201004
08_3-5).
When I was focused on the paper there was nothing else except
what was physically there (20100408_15). It’s almost like the actual
physical H can’t be part of the mental alphabet (20100408_23).
So I see the 4 [drawn in Interviewer’s notebook] and then there’s
nothing really stable coming into view. It’s like the number line
doesn’t know which direction to go in. It’s like there are various things
down on the table and something over here . . . Nothing very precise
came in. Just very different from when you are telling me to think of
the number 4 (20100408_65-67).
Concurrent contexts
AB’s concurrents appear in a range of “contexts” which describe
the perceptual synesthetic experience around the concurrent in
the mental room.
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FIGURE 4 | Mind map of content, themes and sub-themes
derived from the EI data with case AB. This map is
reproduced in the Supplementary Material, where summary
descriptions are provided at each level, and the collated transcript
references supporting our interpretation are provided at the
bottom-most level for each theme.
White page. The “white page” context is described as an A4
piece of paper, presented vertically in front of AB, forward and
below his eye line (see Figure 5). The area around the white page
has “a purple layer here, a green layer here and some black.”
(20100329_395). Concurrents appear centered on the page in a
font size which would fill a “good proportion of the paper . . .
as if there’s only room for that one digit [on the page] with a
good margin around the edge” (20100215_146-148). The white
page provides contrast for the concurrents to be viewed against
the background of the physical room, as AB reports that he has
difficulty identifying the concurrents when they haven’t got the
white page behind them:“It’s almost better to have the white page
there, because it helps me to see the A better” (20100329_399, see
also 20100415_43).
Corridor. When viewing a section of the number line (as
opposed to individual concurrents), concurrents appear in a
“corridor” (see Figure 6). The walls of the corridor are “quite
opaque (20100329_42) although “not like a hard surface like
the table, if you put anything behind [the wall of the corri-
dor] it would go into the fog and you wouldn’t be able to see
it” (20100408_349). These walls are described relatively con-
sistently as a “orangey, reddy, greeney color” (20100222_148)
elsewhere, “orangey, browney, greeney color” (20100222_103)
and “greenish, reddish, orangey” (20100229_108). The floor
of the corridor has similar opaque characteristic as the walls
(20100222_31, 20100222_186). The corridor has a ceiling (e.g.,
20100222_117) and on two occasions the ceiling is referred to
with a source of light, with “little circles of light going down
the corridor” (20100222_159) and opening up into a “Sun roof”
FIGURE 5 | The “white page” context. Number concurrents, when
viewed in isolation, appear against a white, A4 sized background, with the
“line” below, and a purple/green coloring surrounding the page.
(20100222_326). The corridor itself has a “kind of a yellowish
light kind of permeating it” (20100222_146).
The induced concurrent is reported to “float” in the middle of
the corridor (20100320a_47) whilst the concurrents immediately
surrounding it are against the wall or just outside the corridor.
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FIGURE 6 | The “corridor” context, which appears when concurrents
are viewed as part of a sequence. The corridor has a 3D structure, with
walls, a floor and ceiling, and red-orange coloring.
Concurrents with multiple decimal places are experienced with
the decimals trailing down the length of the corridor. The size
of the corridor appears to vary. On one occasion the corridor is
reported to be not much bigger than AB’s head (20100222_126),
on another it is as wide as AB is tall (20100229_182). The corridor
appears to expand width ways to encompass more numbers in the
form: “It’s kind of like the corridor wants to enlarge and have the
7 over here” (20100329_107).
Free space. The free space context is identified by reference to
a specific coloring of the background and a lack of white page
or corridor features. AB describes the free space background as
“unstable,” “sometimes it’s purplish and sometimes it’s greenish.”
(20100329_13). The background “doesn’t make the [physical]
room colored. It’s just like another world [mental room] that I
can focus my attention on, or I can bring my attention back to the
[physical] room” (20100415_55).
Line. AB reports a “line” feature in his number and calendar
forms. The line is not present in the alphabet form as, “[the alpha-
bet] has no continuous values” (20100329_306). The line is seen
both in the free space context, and in the corridor of the num-
ber form. The line is black and has a 3D shape like a “very long
rectangle” (20100222_58). The line is below the white page in the
vertical plane such that AB has to look down from the white page
to see the line (20100215_153). AB suggests that he can see the
page and the line at the same time, although his language use is
slightly ambiguous and may suggest that in switching his atten-
tion between the line or page contexts, his perception of the other
is diminished:
I can definitely see it being kind of located below where the page was
(20100215_155) [emphasis added].
INTERVIEWER: Can you see the number line at the same time
[as the white page]? AB: Yeah, when I see the number line it’s going
like this and below (20100229_49-51) [emphasis added].
In the corridor context, the base of the line is “resting on the
floor [of the corridor]” (20100222_58), bisecting the corridors
width, “going into the wall of the corridor” (20100229_165-166),
and follows the gradient of the number form. In the free space
context, the number concurrents “hover” just above the line
(20100215_172) or the line appears with a gap into which the
concurrent would fit if viewed in the corridor (20100222_95),
with the gap acting as a “marker for where the [number] should
go.” (20100222_109). There is a suggestion that the line functions
as a reference for directing AB’s gaze or attention to other con-
currents, as AB follows it’s gradient toward where he “knows”
another concurrent to be located (e.g., 20100320a_298).
Cave. The “cave” is the usual context of AB’s alphabet form. The
cave is described with a “dampness” (20100329_441) or “muddy”
atmosphere (20100408_315), a dark background (20100329_426)
with depth, like a “a dark hole” (20100329_365). Letter per-
cepts within the cave are described as having “translucent”
(20100408_315) or “ghost-like” qualities (20100408_315) rather
than a solid form. AB describes his head as being in one wall
of the cave, allowing him to look into the depth or toward the
entrance. When the entrance of the cave is explored, AB describes
it as positioned in the side of a mountain (20100329_459) with a
naturalistic scene outside and a “sense of an expansive landscape”
(20100329_457), “sky and clouds” (20100329_461).
Felt presence. AB occasionally reports that he can sense the pres-
ence of a concurrent but not see it directly. These percepts are
often described as “vague,” for example, “these are bit more vague
these ones. They are just kind of more like the feeling or the pres-
ence of the three there” (20100415_27), “I’ve kind of got like the
sense of the six and the seven sort of somewhere around here. Not
really quite sure where they are” (20100329_67).
Context transitions. There are dynamic transitions between the
contexts. These transitions generally occur automatically and in
a predictable manner, although AB is able to trigger them of
his own volition to a limited degree. We present the following
brief diachronic description of context transitions for a number
concurrent (for a more detailed description of each stage in the
transition, see the Supplementary Material):
Initially a new number concurrent is presented on the white
page. Surrounding the white page is a color which is similar to the
free space context. Directed by a change in AB’s focus of atten-
tion to the area below the page, the white page “melts” from the
bottom to the top. This melting is described as, “[if] the page
was made out of ice and there was fire underneath it, and it’s
kind of melting gradually and kind of in a fairly homogeneous
way” (20100329_375). The shift in focus of attention from the
page to the line causes a new concurrent to appear above the line.
Once the new concurrent is stable, the line and corridor come
into view.
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Internal and external dialog
Auditory presentation appears to be the most effective induc-
tion method for AB’s synesthetic percepts, as it is not associated
with direct physical interference of a visually presented item. The
audibly induced item is often accompanied by those items sur-
rounding it in sequence (e.g., the induced experience of a two
will be accompanied by a one and three in the correct positions).
“Thinking about” an inducer will also lead to the experience of
a concurrent (20100305_142), with the thought process often
involving inner speech (20100408_48-51). On other occasions
AB reports to visualize a concurrent to induce a synesthetic
experience (20100222_261-263).
You say 15, I’m actually seeing more digits now. I sort of see 14 and
16 and 17 (20100215_61).
So I’m saying M over and over again in my head. But I’ve got a
glimpse of an L at one point. And I’ve got a glimpse of N O P. It’s
hard to just look at the M (20100329_249).
INTERVIEWER: So if you look at the M, how many letters are
you aware of at the same time? AB: Just depends where I focus
my attention. If I focus just on the M it’s quite hard. It’s almost
like I have to utter the names of the other letters in my head in
order to see them. But as soon as I think, you know, looking at
the M and then thinking about what else I can see, need to start
utteringM or L and then they come into being (20100329_244-245).
INTERVIEWER: So what if you pick a random one, just choose it
yourself, how would you go to it? AB: Yes, then I would have to say it
in my head. So I think Q was kind of here. . . . I kind of just thought
of the letter Q by saying it in my head, then I kind of looked for it
(20100408_48-51).
Directional attention between concurrents
If AB allows his eyes to move freely along the number or
alphabet form, he can see as many or as few concurrents
as he chooses (20100329_251). Directing attention may also
involve inner speech, for example AB reports in one instance
that during this act of “looking for a concurrent” he says to
himself: “right I’m going to look for the 4 now!” (2010040
8_138).
INTERVIEWER: if you let your gaze move a little bit more freely,
how easy is it for the other letters to appear? AB: It’s pretty easy for
H I J K L M N O P Q to appear. R S T. All I have to do is move my
attention along the thing. I can kind of see the whole alphabet if I
want to (20100329_250-251).
INTERVIEWER: What about . . . the other end of the alphabet,
Z? AB: Just have to re-look where it is. INTERVIEWER: It’s just a
movement of the eyes? AB: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: You don’t have to
say anything. AB: No, I think you saying it is enough (20100408_
42-47).
AB also has a strong prior knowledge of where each concur-
rent should be located in relation to another in the same form.
Redirection of attention based on prior knowledge also involves
inner speech.
Erm, normally it’s like I said to myself, “OK, it’s a three so down to
the left of three there should be a one and two.” And then, well there
they are (20100408_93).
Single inducer leads to multiple concurrents
A single inducer may lead to the experience of multiple repre-
sentations of the same concurrent, particularly if AB is directed
to perform some act upon that concurrent. For example, when
AB is asked to view a four from a different angle, he reports to
experience two fours, one in the normal, face-on view and one
back-to-front (20100408_125-129). New or alternate representa-
tions of the same concurrent occupy different locations in the
mental room.
There’s a four and a six kind of here. . . . INTERVIEWER: If you
moved your head from side to side like this, how does your perception
of the number change? AB: Erm, sometimes it tilts a little bit so it’s
kind of bi-stable. . . . It’s like there’s two here. So there’s one where the
four is just like that, and then is another one where it’s kind of [back
to front]. INTERVIEWER: I’ve noticed that at the moment you are
actually standing still. Can you see both of the different ones even
though you are not moving? AB: Yeah, there’s kind of one like this
and there’s one kind of like that. INTERVIEWER: So you have two
different forms there? AB: Yeah (20100408_125-129).
Associations lead to involuntary inductions
Concurrents may be experienced involuntarily if they are related
to the induced concurrent through normal associative mecha-
nisms, for example when “a physical constant [. . .] like the speed
of light” (20100320a_195-196) is presented as an inducer, AB
reported the involuntary experience of five concurrents associated
with other physical constants (20100320a_195-224). Similarly,
when AB is asked to transform a letter into an italic font, a bold
font (an associated type-face) is perceived (20100329_340-345).
INTERVIEWER: What about a physical constant . . . Like the
speed of light (20100320a_195-196). AB: Yeah, what else came
into view was Planck’s constant, like the H bar. I just saw like an
H bar and then over here there’s an equals and a C squared came
up (20100320a_202). INTERVIEWER: So how come the Plank’s
constant appeared? . . . Did you think of the Plank’s constant as well?
AB: Yeah, I guess because it’s another fundamental constant of the
universe. It’s like C [the speed of light] (20100320a_211-214).
INTERVIEWER: Do you think you could get them in italics? AB:
Erm, saw the C though going to italics very briefly, the capital C. . . .
The lower case C is kind of being mixed up. It’s kind of in bold font.
<laughter>(20100329_340-345).
Concurrent experiences persist
Once induced, the experience of the concurrent was found
to persist without the need for it to be directly referred
to (20100229_329, 20100408_40-41). Similarly AB reports
that a percept may remain stable even if it is taken out
of view or attention is directed elsewhere; once attention
is returned, the concurrent is described as if it existed
independently of AB’s attention (20100305_131-132, 2010022
9_388).
60 has rooted now because we’ve been talking about it for quite a bit
(20100229_329).
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INTERVIEWER: When you look at the . . . alphabet [form], are
you aware of having to say H in order to keep it in focus? AB: No, I
think once it’s there I don’t have to say H (20100408_40-41).
INTERVIEWER: What if you . . . take them out of view com-
pletely so if you look behind you so immediately you don’t see
either of them and then you turn around again. Do they remain
exactly where they were before? AB: Yeah still five, six [56], 57
(20100305_131-132).
After several concurrents have been induced through the inter-
view process, AB’s experience contains multiple independent con-
current items, for example, INTERVIEWER: “Do you have any
number lines ready that we could do that with? AB: Erm, I’ve got
all sorts of number lines” (20100408_386-387). This persistence
in the visual representation and spatial location of a concurrent
caused experimental difficulties where AB found there were too
may concurrents present to concentrate on a single item, causing
him to feel “bogged up with loads of numbers” (20100229_384).
This experience of multiple concurrents was not explored further.
Perspective on percept
Concurrents which are directly induced are generally presented
in front of AB in the correct perspective, i.e., “facing,” although
there is one report of a concurrent being turned away slightly
(20100415_185-187).
I’m kind of seeing the five right in front of me (20100215_170).
So I’ve sort of got the number five to the right of my focus now,
and kind of in front of my focus (20100222_33).
New concurrents may also appear at some distance particularly if
they are a new representation of the original concurrent.
INTERVIEWER: So the zoomed out version of the alphabet disap-
peared when you switched your attention to the A? AB: . . . it’s kind
of in the distance. It’s probably further away from me than I can see
(20100329_280-281).
AB is able to view concurrents from different perspectives, e.g.,
if they are placed behind him or if he physically moves round or
above them.
So this one is directly facing me and that one is kind of facing that
way. So I’m kind of slightly sideways on. . . . if you were in the chair
one to your right, it would face you (20100415_185-187).
INTERVIEWER: Can you [physically move round to look at the
percept from different angles]? AB: I can see the back of the four.
Yeah I can kind of see the four backwards. Sometimes it sort of spins
around (20100408_104-105).
Stability of percept
AB often reports “instability” in his percepts, as a flashing or
brief appearance of the concurrent. This instability is reported
when AB attempts to modify a feature of the concurrent from its
preferred or “default” form. For example, attempting to change
the type-face (20100329_340-345) or perspective of the alpha-
bet form (20100415_97-113) results in an experience of a percept
flickering between the default and requested view/feature.
[From an upper case A] I can get the lower case A to flash [into an
upper case A], but then [it] doesn’t stay there (20100329_323).
[AB is asked to see what happens if he looks at a concurrent
whilst he changes his viewing angle by standing up] So it’s kind
of hard to stand up slowly enough . . . INTERVIEWER: . . . you’re
trying to stand up slowly in order to see what? AB: . . . where some
kind of change happens. . . . it seems to flicker (20100415_97-101).
It just came into view when I sort of reached there at a certain angle.
INTERVIEWER: Is it not on the table right now? AB: It’s sort of
flickering (20100415_107-109).
Where AB’s knowledge of a number sequence is limited (e.g., in
the decimal places of pi), he only experiences stable concurrents
for those numbers of which he is certain (20100229_132).
So now I’ve got 3.14159 dot dot dot eight, six, five, six, and then a
whole pool, a whole load of numbers just kind of like jumbled up, like
kind of just there, not really knowing where to go (20100229_147).
So it’s unstable after 3.141527986. Seems pretty unstable after
the third or fourth decimal point. . . . it’s not really holding still it’s
kind of changing because of other numbers trying to get in from
above. . . . So it’s 3.14 and one and a five, and that’s where I start
getting difficulties . . . there’s a nine above the two. INTERVIEWER:
How is it above the two? AB: Just directly above on the page.
INTERVIEWER: Is it stable up there? AB: I just see a jumble of
numbers (20100229_71-83).
INTERVIEWER: What do you see after the five? AB: It’s kind of
dot dot dot, and then there’s kind of some rather blurry numbers to
the right in a crowd (20100320a_14-15).
Selectively directing AB’s attention to specific features of a con-
current appears to improve the stability of the percepts and AB’s
ability to describe it, for example he often uses phrases such as, “if
I think a little bit more then I see . . .” (20100222_5) or “if I really
try and focus . . .” (20100229_398) before going on to describe a
feature which was previously “unstable.”
[AB was asked to inspect the texture of the 5 concurrent in detail]
Yeah. Erm but nothing that stays really too stable. If I really try
and focus I don’t know, I see a little white so it’s kind of mainly
black top bit of it. Erm, then I am seeing a little white circles . . .
[there is a] white circle missing from top corner as though someone
has punched a hole out of it from the top corner (20100229_398)
[emphasis added].
Voluntarily controllable acts
AB is able to perform a number of acts to modify his synesthetic
experience. These include:
1. Changing perspective on a concurrent, either by physically
moving around the room or adopting a different mental per-
ceptual position such that he can view the concurrent from
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a different angle. INTERVIEWER: . . . So how does it change
when you stand up for example? AB: . . . looks like I am kind
of above it, kind of like this. It’s kind of got some depth to it this
time (20100415_68-69).
2. Self-induce concurrents by thinking about them, looking for
them in relation to other concurrents or through the internal
recitation of the concurrent (inner speech). INTERVIEWER:
Can you create a different number line . . .Maybe over there for
example, if you say 55 over in that direction . . . AB: I just faced
this direction and then thought of 55 (20100305_135-142).
3. Overcome physical interference in the mental room through
effortful “willing” of the concurrent to appear. AB: Well it just
appears first away from the [physically presented paper] page. I
have to will an alphabet on the page in order to get it to happen
(20100408_75).
4. Report a visual memory of a concurrent without evoking the
concurrent itself. INTERVIEWER: Did you notice any numbers
when you came into this room? AB: No, ermmaybe I can remem-
ber there was something here. . . .Hard to tell if it’s just a memory
or if it’s really there. INTERVIEWER: Well have a look at the
wall. AB: I remember something being over there as well. Can’t
remember what number it was whether it was a 55 or a 56. Yes,
so there’s obviously nothing there that’s sort of firm there. Kind of
got a bit of an image of a big 55 there then a big 56 sort of stuck
on the wall there. Nothing really that stable (20100320a_2-9).
Although AB’s reports would suggest that he can in some cases
modify a concurrent itself, attempts to do so lead to the gener-
ation of a new concurrent with the desired characteristic, whilst
the original remains unchanged. AB’s ability to exert some level of
control over his synesthetic experience demonstrate the dynamic
and elaborative nature of the visual experience.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we used the EI technique to provide a detailed
phenomenological analysis of SSS in a single case. The conclu-
sions drawn are appropriate to our participant and further work
will be required to test their applicability to a wider population.
Some external validation of the themes derived can none the
less be achieved, by reference to the existing (limited) descrip-
tions of phenomenology. Where there is continuity between the
reports of our participant and those provided elsewhere, we may
assume that these particular themes are generalizable to a wider
population. As our participant reports common phenomenolog-
ical details in the basic form descriptions, it is likely that his
experience in general is also typical of a wider SSS population.
Therefore, where other more novel aspects of phenomenology are
derived for this participant, it is possible that these too may be
generalizable.
Our results show that AB’s synesthetic concurrents exist in
what he terms a “mental room” and that he is able to selectively
shift his attention to either the mental room of the concurrents
or the physical room in which the interviews were conducted.
Although the mental and physical rooms co-exist, percepts in the
physical room appear to interfere with synesthetic concurrents
in the mental room. This interference effect was also found to
be a feature of visually presented inducers such that AB had to
divert his gaze from the physical inducer in order to perceive the
concurrent. The generation of a concurrent frequently followed
auditory induction, for example AB uses internal verbilisation of
the inducer name in order to perceive the concurrent, even when
the inducer was presented visually. We also found that concur-
rents are automatically experienced by association to the inducer,
for example the discussion of the physical constant for the speed
of light causes the automatic perception of related physical con-
stants. AB’s concurrents are not limited to simple letters/numbers,
but also include equations and graph notations. The induced item
is often perceived with adjacent items on the number line, for
example the induction of a two may lead to the perception of
a one and a three. The stability of synesthetic percepts is found
to increase with focused attention on the concurrent percept.
AB is also able to voluntarily modulate the features of a con-
current, although they appear to have a default type-face and/or
perspective.
As this is a case study, it remains to be seen to what extent the
precise nature and content of all themes of AB’s SSS experience
generalize to a wider population. For example, the experience of
a “black hole” representative of infinite decimal places may be
highly idiosyncratic and unique to AB in his conceptualization
of infinity. Other idiosyncratic features may include AB’s abil-
ity to move around the spatial form whilst it remains static, and
the precise nature and content of the concurrent contexts of the
white page, corridor and cave. The unique and artificial expe-
rience of the EI may have drawn out details of AB’s experience
which are not a common feature of the every-day SSS experience.
For example, on many occasions AB only perceives the attended
concurrent, and a few surrounding items. This may be due to
the high level of focus placed on individual concurrents for the
purposes of guided exploration. Further investigation may deter-
mine whether the process of EI can reveal similar themes for
other participants. Three themes in particular may be relevant in
developing our understanding of SSS, namely, (1) the description
of the physical and mental room; (2) the effect of internal and
external dialog; (3) the apparent persistence of concurrents after
induction.
PHYSICAL-MENTAL ROOM
AB’s description of the mental-room can be considered in light
of the projector and associator distinctions in grapheme-color
synesthesia (Dixon et al., 2004). AB reported in the first inter-
view that he is “projecting a mental image” when he perceives
a synesthetic concurrent (20100215_22). AB’s description of the
mental room as “another dimension” (20100408_185) is interest-
ing, but of itself says little about the experience. More telling is the
apparent relationships between the physical and mental rooms
such that the physical can obscure or distract from the mental
andmake it difficult to visualize or fully induce a concurrent. This
effect may be informative in providing a basis for the exploration
of first-person experience of projector-associator effects, however,
the projector-associator distinction is an assumption of sequence-
color synesthesia, and not SSS; although SSS experiences have
been described as occupying “distinct loci in imaginal, periper-
sonal or extrapersonal space” (Price and Pearson, 2013, p. 1166),
projector-like and associator-like traits have not, to the best of
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our knowledge, been formalized in SSS. Any direct comparison
between the experience of our subject and the current under-
standing of the projector-associator experience may therefore
be premature. The observation that AB can readily distinguish
between the physical and mental rooms (even when they inter-
fere) underlines that his synesthetic experiences, while at times
perceptually real, are not subjectively veridical—that is, they are
not experienced as being part of the external, real world (Seth,
2014).
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIALOG
AB internally verbalized the name of the inducer each time he self-
induced a concurrent (i.e., when the inducer was not presented by
the interviewer). This included occasions when he redirected his
attention from one concurrent to another, or when he freely chose
a concurrent to explore. When he was visually presented with
an inducer, he needed to say the name of that inducer internally
before the concurrent was experienced, and repeated the name
of the inducer to stabilize his visual experience and maintain his
focus of attention. This use of inner speechmay not be surprising,
given the inter-relation of orthographic and phonemic represen-
tations in neural processing, however, it was uniquely identifiable
by the process of EI and has not been previously demonstrated
in SSS; other methods may have accepted AB’s initial descriptions
(e.g., of the redirection of spatial attention) without probing fur-
ther into the acts involved in the generation of a concurrent. This
is an example of EI enabling reflective access to an aspect of sub-
jective experience which was previously pre-reflective. This also
exemplifies the in-depth exploration of diachronic structures of
experience promoted by EI.
External auditory instruction was the most direct and effec-
tive route to induction of a concurrent for AB. The primacy of
auditory induction may account for AB’s primary use of inner
speech during all other inductions. Auditory-visual synesthesia
is commonly considered to include only more overt forms such
as the experience of colors with music (e.g., Goller et al., 2009).
As such, SSS and other forms (e.g., grapheme-color synesthesia)
have typically been assumed to result from visual-visual inter-
actions. There are, however, investigations of visual-visual types
which have used auditory presentation of inducers and found
results comparable to visually presented inducers (Paulesu et al.,
1995; Nunn et al., 2002; Steven et al., 2006). In SSS, a case
has also been described in which auditory and visual presen-
tation of an inducer lead to different perspectives of the form
being perceived (Jarick et al., 2009b). These findings suggest that
auditory induction is sufficient to cause the synesthetic experi-
ence, and the evidence here from EI suggests that it is in most
cases necessary in the case of AB, even when items are presented
visually.
Assuming there is some overlap between the neural mecha-
nisms involved in processing internal versus external speech, the
processes of concurrent induction via inner speech may be simi-
lar to the processes involved in concurrent induction via external
auditory presentation. As all methods of induction engaged inner
speech for this subject, the experience of SSS might be re-framed
as primarily auditory-visual process for AB and potentially in
other SS synesthetes. Compatible with this hypothesis, children
in most English-speaking countries learn the ordinal sequence of
the alphabet phonemically through song before they are able to
associate the visual grapheme and letter name (Ehri, 2009). Seron
et al. found that the SS synesthetes they investigated were less effi-
cient in verbal strategies according to Paivio’s degree of imagery
questionnaire (Paivio and Harshman, 1983) and suggest that
the visual spatial form may have developed as a compensatory
strategy to reinforce the ordinality of audibly presented items
(Seron et al., 1992). This suggestion may have particular impli-
cations for the development of SSS, particularly if it is framed
as an auditory-visual association, rather than a visual-visual or
visual-spatial.
This formalism of SSS as a trait relevant to the develop-
ment of visuospatial representations has been re-introduced by
Price and Pearson (2013), who argued that the apparent auto-
maticity of spatial forms may in fact represent deliberate recall
of the specific visuospatial representation. Indeed, Price and
Pearson (2013) suggest that the development of the spatial form
may be closely related to the development of the phonological
loop during rehearsal, where the dual encoding of visuospa-
tial and auditory representations may be beneficial to learning.
Our data support the central intuitions of Price and Pearson
(2013) and Price and Mattingley (2013), in the suggested involve-
ment of the phonological loop in concurrent generation and
by demonstrating that the apparent automaticity of our partic-
ipant’s experience is graded, or only has the appearance of an
involuntary feel.
VISUOSPATIAL MEMORY AND PERSISTENCE OF CONCURRENTS
Once induced, AB will continue to experience a concurrent even
when direct attention is drawn away from it. Similarly, Jarick
reported that her subject (L) experienced a persistence of induced
concurrents until they were “not needed any more” for the
purposes of mental viewpoint navigation (Jarick, 2010, p. 88).
Although this finding of persistence has also been identified via
more commonplace first-person methods (e.g., semi-structured
interviews), the level of detail made available by EI is unparalleled
thus far. Specifically, whilst Jarick refers to persistence until con-
currents “are not needed” (Jarick, 2010), our data suggest that the
development of this persistence is based on sustained exposure
and focus on the concurrent, which may have implications for
the development or encoding of spatial forms in terms of visu-
ospatial imagery and memory. We also find that AB experiences
a sense of “presence” when he cannot directly see a concurrent
but knows where it should be in relation to others. These two fea-
tures suggest involvement of visuo-spatial memory processes in
SSS, where the memory of a concurrent position is sufficient to
hold the synesthetic experience in active working memory, either
as a visual experience or as non-spatial visual content. This fea-
turemay be relevant to the development of SSS in individuals, as it
may enable the maintenance of a visual representation when ordi-
nal sequences are being taught. Brang et al. (2010) and Simner
et al. (2009) have reported superior visuo-spatial memory abil-
ities in SS synesthetes, as demonstrated in their ability to learn
new spatial forms (Brang et al., 2010) and perform above average
in assessments of visuo-spatial recall such as the Visual Patterns
Test (Della Sala, 1997; Simner et al., 2009).
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BLIND ANALYSIS EXTENDS PREVIOUS INTROSPECTIVE REPORTS
Our results extend standard introspective reports collected else-
where. For example, 19 of the Seron et al. subjects report that,
once activated, a concurrent could not be moved, supporting
our findings on the persistence of concurrents and AB’s neces-
sity to generate a new representation of the concurrent rather
than modifying an original. Subjects also reported being bet-
ter able to “make use” of their representation where they had a
free “visual field,” e.g., when their eyes were closed. This state-
ment is compatible with our findings of physical interference,
where AB’s concurrents were placed in areas of an uninterrupted
visual scene in the mental room, so as to avoid conflict with
items in the physical room which hold more salience than the
mental room percepts. As with our subject, Seron et al. also
report that for his subjects the “vividness” of the number con-
current increases when the subjects concentrate on it (Seron
et al., 1992, p. 174). Through the application and analysis of
the EI data collected here we have been able to identify that
this concentration is experienced by the subject in many cases as
internal recitation of the inducer name, highlighting the impor-
tance of inner speech in the induction process. One of the Seron
et al. subjects also reports to automatically experience the con-
currents immediately surrounding the induced item, as with
our subject.
NEW INSIGHTS MAY BE USED TO DIRECT FUTURE QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
The present findings suggest new opportunities for future inves-
tigations of SSS and associated synesthesia phenomenology. For
example, quantitative investigations should consider the interfer-
ence of physical objects in the perception of synesthetic concur-
rents and associated limitations of visually presented inducers.
Early self-reports from SS synesthetes described the expe-
rience as occurring involuntarily and automatically (Cytowic,
1989). However, our subject reports that he is not continually
“swamped” with concurrents on a daily basis, despite continually
reading and seeing numbers and letters in his external environ-
ment. Indeed, a pilot investigation with our participant, using
the Descriptive Experience Sampling method (Hurlburt, 2009;
Hurlburt et al., 2009), captured a moment when AB was actively
engaged with letters and numbers on a computer screen, but he
reported no awareness of any synesthetic experience. As such, the
perception of a concurrent is not entirely automatic for AB, in
line with evidence that automaticity of concurrents can vary in
grapheme-color synesthesia (Rothen et al., 2013). We have also
noted specific instances of where AB does retain voluntary con-
trol over his synesthetic experience. These examples support the
challenge to the assumption of automaticity in SSS, as suggested
by Price and Pearson (2013), and the issue of automaticity in SSS
may be a topic usefully explored with EI across multiple subjects.
For our subject, the concurrent was generated through internal
verbalization; it remains to be seen, with the further applica-
tion of EI or other procedures, how much detail can be obtained
regarding the apparent automaticity of concurrent perception.
The role of visual imagery in SSS could also be investigated further
(Price and Pearson, 2013). Specifically, the experience of “unsta-
ble” concurrents could be investigated in synesthetic participants,
and compared qualitatively with descriptions of “unstable” visual
imagery in non-synesthetic participants3.
The phenomenology presented here is by no means exhaus-
tive. A number of unresolved issues are immediately identifiable,
such as the role of inner speech and focused attention in stabiliz-
ing a concurrent. We may ask how inner speech impacts mental
imagery, and whether non-synesthetes employ similar methods
of inner speech as observed here. We also demonstrate that the
apparent automaticity of SSS can be investigated with this method
in terms of phenomenological experience. Price and Mattingley
(2013) have recently argued that SSS does not meet the neces-
sary behavioral criteria to be termed truly automatic. Indeed,
we have determined here that although synesthetic concurrents
were initially described to arise automatically, in the majority of
cases, our subject went through a process of internal verbalization
of the inducer name before the concurrent was perceived. This
may relate to the task-specific strategies suggested by Price and
Mattingley (2013) to mediate the cueing effects of SSS. Further
exploration of the diachronic and synchronic structure of the
spatial cueing effect may help determine the causal relationship
between the appearance of the concurrent and the shift in spatial
attention.
CONCLUSIONS
Phenomenological descriptions of SSS have so far been largely
confined to descriptions of spatial locations pertaining to spe-
cific inducers (e.g., numbers, letters, calendar date). Here,
employing a second-person method designed to increase the
reporting access to pre-reflective aspects of experience, we have
provided a comprehensive description of our subject’s spa-
tial form for a range of ordinal sequences including num-
ber, calendars, alphabets and ages, and extend the depth and
breadth of relevant phenomenological information which has
been acquired for SSS, or indeed any other form of visual
synesthesia. We also introduced new associated synesthetic expe-
riences such as concurrents for graphs, equations and math-
ematical concepts. Using the formalism of Grounded Theory
analysis, we identified seven main themes in AB’s SSS experience,
as below.
1. Form descriptions
2. Physical and mental rooms
3. Concurrent contexts
4. Inducer-concurrent relationships
5. Perspective taking on the concurrent
6. Stability of the percept
7. Voluntarily controllable acts
Some of these themes have been described elsewhere (e.g., Seron
et al., 1992; Jarick, 2010), however, these sources provide only
limited information the first-person experience of the subject. As
such, the present results provide a unique level of detail which
may be beneficial in devising future investigations.
3EI could also be usefully applied in elaborating the phenomenological expe-
rience of “vividness” of visual imagery, which is central in ratings of visual
imagery, e.g., VVIQ (Marks, 1973).
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We report the first application of the EI method to SSS, and
indeed to synesthesia more widely. We demonstrate that it is
possible to gain informative second-person descriptions of synes-
thetic phenomenology from a naïve subject, through rigorous
data collection and analysis, and demonstrate the value of the
EI method in enabling access to subtle aspects of the experience.
We gained unprecedented detail regarding the precise synesthetic
phenomenology of this subject, which may be generalizable to
a wider population. We also provide access to interview data as
raw transcripts, alongside the structured and analyzed form in
the Supplementary Material. This is a rich data source and we
invite the interested reader to explore avenues for further con-
nections between the themes uncovered here and other aspects
of SSS, or synesthesia more generally. Appreciation for the pre-
cise phenomenological experience in synesthesia should focus
future research endeavors, as we seek to understand the extent
and limitations of the experience from the perspective of the
participant. Such work may transform consciousness science by
bringing objectivity to experiential phenomenology.
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